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Optimal Selling Mechanisms under Imperfect Commitment
Juan I. Beccutiy
Universität Bern - Department of Economics
April, 2014
Abstract
This paper studies the optimal mechanisms for a seller with imperfect commitment who puts
up for sale one individual unit per period to a single buyer in a dynamic game. The buyers
willingness to pay remains constant over time and is his private information. In this setting,
the seller cannot achieve greater payo¤s than those obtained by posting a price in each period.
However, price posting is not optimal if the buyer is su¢ ciently impatient relative to the seller. It
is also proved that a mechanism à la Goethe (see Moldovanu and Tieztel 1998) is almost optimal.
Keywords: asymmetric information, imperfect commitment, dynamics, mechanism design,
non-optimality of posting prices.
JEL codes: D82
1 Introduction
In 1797, Goethe was in the process of trying to sell his most recent work, the epic poem Hermann
and Dorothea. However, he was concerned about the information asymmetry between him and the
publisher with respect to the publishers valuation of his work.1 Goethe decided to propose the
following selling mechanism: each one (Goethe and the publisher) would send a sealed note with
their demanded price to a lawyer; the sale would take place at Goethes price only in the case that
the publishers demanded price was higher than or equal to Goethes demanded price.2 With this
mechanism, Goethe wanted to learn something about the publishers valuation and obtain some
advantage in future transactions.
Goethes story illustrates a common situation in the market place. A seller wants to sell something
to a buyer whose willingness to pay is private. The seller may use information from past sales to the
same buyer to infer his willingness to pay and to implement pricing schemes that better discriminate
among consumers. However, from a theoretical point of view, this is not obvious because consumers
(the publisher in Goethes case) may have incentives to act strategically to mislead the learning
process of the seller.
This paper is part of my Ph.D. dissertation at Universidad Carlos III de Madrid. I thank in particular to Angel
Hernando-Veciana for his advice and encouragement. I also thank to Marco Celentani, Mikhail Drugov, María Angeles
de Frutos, Daniel Garcia, Antoine Loeper, Marc Möller and seminar audiences in seminars at EEA-ESEM 2012 and
Universidad Rovira i Virgili.
yjuan.beccuti@vwi.unibe.ch.
1See Moldovanu, B. and Tieztel, M. (1998) for the complete story.
2As Moldovanu and Tietzel (1998) pointed this is a second-price auction in which the sealed reserve price of the
seller has the e¤ect of a second bidder.
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For instance, Hart and Tirole (1988) argue that a monopolist that sells a perishable unit in each
period and has full commitment power at the beginning of the game nds it optimal to commit to
ignoring all the information that she learns along the equilibrium path about the type of the buyer.
Then, the buyer has no incentives to lie during one period to manipulate the sellers belief. However,
full commitment is a very extreme assumption and it is possible to nd many situations in which a
short-term commitment relationships ts better.3
There is extensive literature related to bargaining under conditions of asymmetric information
where only one party has the right to make o¤ers. Most of them study the case of durable goods, in
which the game nishes when a buyer accepts an o¤er.4 On the other hand, Hart and Tirole (1988)
and Schmidt (1992) study the case of repeated bargaining where a player with bargaining power
trades a service or perishable good in every period with non-anonymous and su¢ ciently patient
agents.5 All these previous articles restrict the monopolists strategy to a sequence of posted prices.
Nothing guarantees that this mechanism is the optimal one. It is natural to ask if the monopolist
has a better selling mechanism to maximize her benets.
The purpose of this paper is to study the conditions under which price posting may be an optimal
selling mechanism. In particular, this question is studied in a framework in which a seller commits to
use a selling mechanism for the current period, but not for future ones. It is considered a two-period
model with one seller (she) and one buyer (he). The buyer has two possible valuations for the good
which are his private information. In every period the seller has one perishable good to sell, which
is produced at zero cost.
The main result is that the seller cannot achieve greater expected payo¤ than the one obtained
by posting a price in each period. However, price posting is not optimal if the buyer is su¢ ciently
impatient relative to the seller. In this last case, there are intertemporal gains from trade that the
seller exploits when using a non-price posting selling mechanism. As consequence, the selling model
and the renting model for a durable good are not any more equivalent when one does not restrict
attention to price posting mechanism.
The paper also shows that it is possible to rationalize the mechanism used by Goethe. Although
Moldovanu and Tieztel (1998) shows that Goethes mechanism is optimal in an static framework,
the description of the story ts better with a dynamic framework. In this framework, Goethes
mechanism is almost optimal if one assumes that the publisher is relatively impatient with respect
to Goethe. This seems a reasonable assumption since publishers could not count on dealing with
Goethe in the future with any type of certainty.
Skreta (2006) has shown that posting a price is the optimal selling mechanism when a monopolist
with a short-term commitment has a durable good to sell to a single buyer that the monopolist
addresses repeatedly. This paper looks for the optimal selling mechanism when such a monopolist
rents that durable good or, instead, has a perishable good or a service to sell. Technically, there is a
crucial di¤erence. In Skreta (2006), the game nishes when the buyer buys the good, but this is not
the case in the model developed below. Her procedure is not directly applicable to it because she
sustains her analysis on the fact that the only non-trivial continuation value arises when the good
is not sold. In the model proposed in this paper, the buyer has to take into account how his future
surplus is going to be a¤ected in case of buying and in case of rejecting the good, i.e. there are two
continuation values.
The model is solved using a dynamic mechanism design approach following the procedure pro-
posed in Bester and Strausz (2001). In that article, they provide a modied version of the revelation
3For some real world examples about the inability of the principal to commit see La¤ont and Tirole (1988), La¤ont
and Tirole (1993) or McAfee and Vincent (1997).
4See for example Fudenberg, Levine and Tirole (1985), or Sobel and Takahashi (1983).
5Hart and Tirole study both cases: the durable good case and the case in which the monopolist decides to rent it.
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principle where the seller has imperfect commitment.
The paper is organized as follows. Section 2 provides a general setup of the problem and reviews
the Bester and Strausz (2001) revelation principle for this type of environment. Section 3 analyzes
the problem and gives a characterization of the optimal selling mechanism. Section 4 proves that
this result does not hold when players have di¤erent discount factors, discusses its implications and
shows that the mechanism proposed by Goethe can be interpreted in this direction. Finally, Section
5 concludes. All proofs are relegated to the Appendix.
2 General Setup
Next, it is proposed a dynamic problem that follows the framework in Bester and Strausz (2001).6
The problem is solved by recursive methods as they suggest. Therefore, this section directly states
a dynamic problem as a sequence of static problems.
Consider a two-period game with r = f1; 2g, where r is the number of periods remaining at the
beginning of the current period. There is one risk-neutral seller (the principal) and one risk-neutral
buyer (the agent) facing each other repeatedly. Both players discount the future at the same rate
 2 (0; 1]. At every period, the seller can produce at zero cost a non-storable object that is put up
for sale to the buyer.7 This buyer has valuation i for the good, where i 2  = fL; Hg. Let call
L (H) the low-type buyer (high-type buyer), which sometimes is denoted by the subscript L (H).
Valuation remains constant over time and is the buyers private information. The probability of a
high-type buyer is denoted by pH , and of a low-type buyer by pL = 1   pH . This pH indicates the
prior of the seller.
A mechanism  r in period r species a message set Mr and a decision function yr = (xr; wr),
where xr : Mr ! [0; 1] is the allocation rule and wr : Mr ! R is the payment rule. Then, each
element mr 2 Mr commits the seller to implement the allocation rule xr(mr) and requires for the
buyer the payment wr(mr).
The seller has imperfect commitment. This is, during the rst period the seller can commit
herself to a mechanism for the current period but not to a mechanism for the next period. So, at the
beginning of the rst period the seller chooses a mechanism  2 2  given her prior about facing a
high-type, where is the space of mechanisms. Next, the buyer observes the mechanism. His strategy
species the probability qi(m2) with which the buyer sends each message, where qi :M2 ! [0; 1], for
i 2 fL;Hg and that veries
P
m22M2 qi(m2) = 1. The buyer can always choose not to participate in
the proposed mechanism.8 In this case, he gets zero instant payo¤s but he can choose to participate
in the second period. Next, the seller observes the message sent by the buyer, implements the
mechanism and updates her belief about facing a high-type buyer. This new belief, pH;2(m2), is
updated following the mapping pH;2 :M2 ! [0; 1]. In the following, pL;2(m2) indicates 1  pH;2(m2)
and p2(m2) indicates the vector of posteriors (pL;2(m2); pH;2(m2)). Updated beliefs constitute the
state variable for the next period. Then, at the beginning of period r = 1 the seller chooses a
new mechanism  1 2  given her updated beliefs, the buyer observes  1 and chooses his strategy
in response. The seller observes the new message, implements the new mechanism and the game
nishes.
6Notation is as similar as possible to theirs in order to simplify the reference to their work.
7All results fo this paper hold for any constant production cost strictly less than the minimum possible value that
the buyer is willing to pay.
8Note that the denition of the mechanism requires participation. The model takes the usual convention that the
buyer can decide whether to participate or not, getting zero payo¤s in the last case. This convention is discussed later,
with the individual rationality constraint (IR). Alternatively, it is possible to include a message in M2 that represents
no participation.
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2.1 Equilibrium concept
At every period, given Mr, the seller looks for the Perfect Bayesian Equilibrium (PBE) of this game.
Hence, choosing the appropriate  r, the seller can choose a particular PBE.
Denote by vr(mr) and ui;r(mr) to the sellers and buyers instant payo¤, respectively, when the
buyer with valuation i sends the message mr, i.e.
vr(mr) = wr(mr);
ui;r(mr) = xr(mr)i   wr(mr):
Let V1 : [0; 1]
2 ! R and Ui;1 : [0; 1]2 ! R represent the continuation values for each player when
r = 2.9
Consequently, given a prior p  (pL; pH), the sellers problem at period r = 2 is to choose
(q2; p2; 2) that maximize:10X
i2
X
m22M2
piqi (m2) (v2(m2) + V1 (p2(m2))) ; (1)
where q2  (q2 (m2))m22M2 , q2 (m2) indicates the vector (qL(m2); qH(m2)), and p2  (p2 (m2))m22M2 .
Notice that when the buyer is indi¤erent between di¤erent messages, he randomizes between them.
The seller knows this but she does not observe which probability the buyer chooses for each message.
Assume that she can always select the best equilibrium between all the possible ones as is usual in
mechanism design.
Sellers objective at (1) is subject to the following constraints:
 The buyers Incentive Compatibility (ICi;2): the buyer chooses his optimal reporting strategy,
i.e., X
m22M2
qi (m2) (ui;2(m2) + Ui;1 (p2 (m2)))  (2)X
m22M2
q0i (m2) (ui;2(m2) + Ui;1 (p2 (m2)))
for i 2 fL;Hg ; and for all q0i (m2).
 The buyers Individual Rationality (IRi;2): The buyers individual rationality constraint has
to be satised:
pi
24 X
m22M2
qi (m2) (ui;2(m2) + Ui;1 (p2 (m2)))   Ui;1
35  0 (3)
for i 2 fL;Hg ; where Ui;1 is the continuation value when the buyer choose not to participate
in the mechanism  2. Let assume Ui;1 = 0 since, as it will be shown later, this is the case at the
optimal contract (since it is possible to assume any belief for the out-of-equilibrium message).
9Continuation values depends on the vector of priors at the beginning of the period. Since there are two types, the
vector of priors is completely determined by the prior about facing a high type, i.e. pH;r+1. Then, later in the paper,
and with some abuse of notation, continuation values will be represented as depending only in that prior.
10 In Bester and Strausz specifaction, it is allowed vi;2(m2) 6= vj;2(m2) when i 6= j givingP
i2
P
m22M2 pi;3qi;2 (m2) (vi;2(m2) + Vi;1(p2)).
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 And nally, for each message, the sellers updated belief pi;2 (m2) has to be consistent with
Bayesrule (BR2) whenever possible:
pi;2 (m2)
X
j2
pjqj (m2) = piqi (m2) : (4)
It follows that the sellers problem with imperfect commitment at r = 2 is given by:
V2(p3) = Max
fq2;p2; 2g
X
i2
X
m22M2
piqi (m2) (v2(m2) + V1 (p2 (m2))) ; (5)
subject to (2)  (4):
The outcome (q2; p2; 2) is incentive feasible if it satises (2)-(4) for all i 2 . Additionally, it
is incentive e¢ cient if it satises (5), the seller chooses the best outcome among all of the incentive
feasible ones. An optimal mechanism is a mechanism  2 that belongs to an incentive e¢ cient outcome
(q2; p2; 2). Finally, (q2; p2; 2) and (q02; p
0
2; 
0
2) are payo¤ equivalent if they leave the seller and the
buyer (of every possible type) with the same expected payo¤s, i.e.X
i2
X
m22M2
piqi (m2) (v2(m2) + V1 (p2 (m2))) =X
i2
X
m022M 02
piqi
 
m02
  
v2(m
0
2) + V1
 
p02 (m2)

;
X
m22M2
qi (m2) (ui;2(m2) + Ui;1 (p2 (m2))) =X
m022M 02
q0i
 
m02
  
ui;2(m
0
2) + Ui;1
 
p02 (m2)

; i 2 fL;Hg :
2.2 Revelation Principle
This subsection shows that, i) we can restrict to direct mechanisms, ii) p2 is always determined by
Bayesrule (consequently there are not out-of-equilibrium beliefs) and, iii) it is enough to consider a
subset of all possible q2.
A direct mechanism is a mechanism in which the message set is the buyers type set, i.e.,Mr = .
In this case, the buyers strategy is to report each type with some probability, i.e., qi :  ! [0; 1],
with
P
mr2 qi(mr) = 1. Bester and Strausz (2001) provides a revelation principle for environments
with imperfect commitment, including the multistage contracting case as the problem proposed in
this work. Based on this revelation principle, the solution of (5) using direct mechanisms, i.e.:
Lemma 1 Assume a state pr+1. Any solution (qr; pr; r) for (5) is payo¤s equivalent to a solu-
tion

q̂r; p̂r;  ̂r

where  ̂r is a direct mechanism and where the buyer reports his type with positive
probability, i.e., q̂i(i) > 0 8 i 2 fL;Hg.
Proof. This lemma is a direct application of Proposition 2 and its corollary at Bester and Strausz
(2001).
Bester and Strausz (2001) shows that it is su¢ cient for the mechanism designer to consider
mechanisms in which the set of messages has equal cardinality to the type space. Moreover, they
show that we can associate each message with a type that plays the message with positive probability.
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A consequence is that the mechanism designer can be restricted to outcomes (qr; pr; r) where
the mechanism has  as the message set. Then, as every message that belongs to  is reported with
positive probability, she can always associate a message with the corresponding type. That is, she
asks every type to report the truth with positive probability, i.e., qH > 0 and 1   qL > 0 where qH
(qL) is the probability that a high-type buyer (low-type buyer) sends a high-type message.
Notice that this revelation principle di¤ers from the standard one (see Myerson 1981) in that
there is no guarantee that the buyer reports his true type with certainty. Even so, truthful reporting
is always an optimal strategy for the buyer and he still plays it with positive probability.
Given some mechanism  r, (2) requires that any message which is played with positive probability
must be optimal for the buyer. From the revelation principle either qH = 1 (qL = 0), in which case
(2) requires that the high-type (low-type) prefers to report the truth, or qH < 1 (qL > 0) in which
case (2) requires indi¤erence between both messages. Hence, in this two-period setting, (2) can be
simplied to:
ICH;2 : uH;2(h) + UH;1(p2(h))  uH;2(l) + UH;1(p2(l)) with equality if 1  qH > 0;
ICL;2 : uL;2(l) + UL;1(p2(l))  uL;2(h) + UL;1(pr(h)) with equality if qL > 0;
where, from now on, h and l indicates a high-type and low-type message, respectively.
As every message is sent with positive probability by at least one type, (4) is always satised.
As a consequence, the posteriors are completely determined by Bayesrule and p2 is a redundant
variable of optimization.
Without loss of generality, the analysis is concentrated on those incentive feasible outcomes such
that qH  qL. For those incentive feasible outcomes such that qL > qH , simply dene a new
mechanism in which the role of each message is interchanged (the corresponding Lemma and its
proof are relegated to the Appendix). Notice that qH  qL implies pH;2(h)  pH  pH;2(l) by Bayes
rule.
3 Optimal Selling Mechanism
This section solves the two-period case of the previous problem using backward induction. It is
proved that the optimal selling mechanism in both periods can be implemented by price posting,
i.e., a take-it-or-leave-it o¤er.
Denition 1 A Price Posting Mechanisms in period r -in what follows price posting- is an indirect
mechanism with two possible messages "take  it" or "leave  it", with allocation and payment rules
according to:
xr(mr) =

1 if mr = take  it;
0 if mr = leave  it:
; wr(mr) =

zr if mr = take  it;
0 if mr = leave  it:
where zr 2 < is the price asked by the seller.
3.1 Period r=1
Last period solution is very well known. To get it, instead of using Bester and Strausz, it is possible
to apply standard mechanism design (see for example Bolton and Dewatripont, 2005) without loss
of generality.
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When sellers belief in facing a high-type buyer is larger than L=H , she proposes a separation
mechanism: high-type buyer receives the good with certainty and pays his valuation, while a low-
type buyer does not receive the good and pays zero. On the other hand, when that belief is lower
L=H , she proposes pooling: every buyer gets the good and payment is the low-type valuation. A
belief equal to L=H is the limit between both mechanisms, i.e., the seller is indi¤erent between
both mechanisms. She can even propose any mechanism in which allocation for message l is any
value between 0 and 1. However, the seller cannot do better than in the pooling or separation cases.
From now on, and to simplify the notation, allocation for message l in this case is considered equal
to zero.11
Remark 1 The optimal mechanism at r = 1 can be implemented by the following price posting:
a) if pH;2  L=H , w1(take  it) = H ;
b) if pH;2 < L=H , w1(take  it) = L:
Proof. The proof consists in showing that there is an indirect mechanism with the properties of
a take-it-or-leave-it o¤er that is payo¤ equivalent to our optimal direct mechanism. Because this is
a one period game, it is straightforward. See the Appendix for the details.
3.2 Period r=2
Hence continuation values for the high-type buyer, for the low-type buyer and for the seller, are
respectively:
UH;1 (pH;2) = I[0;L=H) (pH;2) ; (6)
UL;1 (pH;2) = 0; 8 pH;2;
V1 (pH;2) = pH;2H

1  UH;1 (pH;2)


+
UH;1 (pH;2)

L:
As the continuation values for the low-type are zero for every prior, his payo¤s at r = 2 are only
his instant payo¤, while the payo¤s for the high-type buyer are the sum of the instant payo¤s and
his continuation value at (6).
The following lemma states proves that sellers problem at (5) for r = 2, after simplications of
Section 2.1, is equivalent to (7).
11Choosing any other value of allocation for message l in that case does not change main results of the paper. Bester
and Strausz specication allows the possibility of giving to the seller the option of choosing this value at rst period.
Using an example, it can be shown that at rst period the seller prefers x1(l) = 1 when her prior is lower than L=H ,
and x1(l) = 0 when her prior is higher than L=H . Including this action for the seller complicates the model without
upsetting the results.
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Lemma 2 The sellers problem at (5) for r = 2 is equivalent to the reduced program:
Max
fq2; 2g
X
i=L;H
X
m2=l;h
piqi(m2) [v2(m2) + V1(pH;2(m2))] ; subject to, (7)
ICH;2 : uH;2(h) + UH;1 (p2 (h)) = uH;2(l) + UH;1 (p2 (l)) ;
IRL;2 : uL;2(l) + UL;1 (p2 (l)) = 0;
SMC2 : x2(h)  x2(l)  
UH;1 (p2(l))

  UH;1 (p2(h))

; with equality if qL > 0;
BR2 : pi;2 (m2) =
piqi (m2)P
k=L;H
pkqk(m2)
; m2 = l; h; i = L;H
x2 2 [0; 1] ; qH > 0; qL < 1:
Proof. See the Appendix
In this reduced program, the seller considers a binding incentive compatibility constraint for the
high-type (ICH;2), a binding individual rationality for the low-type (IR

L;2) and a new constraint,
the Sequential Monotonicity Condition for r = 2 (SMC2), which replaces the incentive compatibility
of low-type.
The proof has three steps. First, the incentive compatibility of the high-type (ICH;2) jointly
with the individual rationality of the low-type (IRL;2) imply that individual rationality of the high-
type (IRH;2) is always satised. Second, the seller can increase the payment for both messages
the same amount without changing continuation values and while keeping satised both incentive
compatibility constraints and the individual rationality of the low-type buyer. It is optimal for the
seller to make this increment in payments until the one for low-type message extracts all his surplus,
resulting in IRL;2. This payment is the maximum value that the low-type buyer can pay without
retreating from the mechanism. Suppose that high-type continuation values are xed. Once the
seller xes previous payment, she continues increasing the high-type messages payment until the
high-type buyer is indi¤erent to reporting the truth or not in such a way that continuation values
do not change, i.e., ICH;2 for those continuation values. For di¤erent xed continuation values, the
seller could follow the same procedure getting again ICH;2 for the new continuation values. Hence,
the outcome that maximizes sellers payo¤must be one in which ICH;2 is binding. Note that, because
the high-type buyer is indi¤erent to both messages, the requirement that he must tell the truth with
positive probability is satised. Finally, assuming ICH;2 and IR

L;2, the incentive compatibility of
the low-type buyer (ICL;2) is equivalent to the SMC2. This new restriction plays a similar role as
the monotonicity condition of the static case, which asks to allocation to be increasing in the buyer
type. In fact, notice that if  = 0, this model would collapse to the static case and the SMC2
to the monotonicity condition. In this dynamic framework, the SMC2 is more restrictive than the
monotonicity condition.12 It still asks that the current allocation increases in the buyer type. It also
requires that the di¤erence in current allocations must be at least as large as the di¤erence between
the discounted continuation values (weighted by ) that the high-type buyer gets by lying and by
telling the truth.
Operating with ICH;2 and IR

L;2 and plugging them into the sellers objective function, the sellers
12The case under which the SMC2 is weaker than the standard monotonicity condition can be ruled out since
p2(h)  p2(l) and hence UH;1 (p2(l))  UH;1 (p2(h)).
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problem at (7) becomes
Max
fq2;x2g
x2(l)L + H;3 (x2(h)  x2(l)) H + H;3 [UH;1 (pH;2(h))  UH;1 (pH;2(l))] (8)
+ 

H;3V1(pH;2 (h)) +
 
1  H;3

V1(pH;2 (l))

;
subject to,
SMC2; BR2; x2 2 [0; 1] ; qH > 0; and qL < 1:
where H;3 = (pHqH + pLqL) is the total probability of observing a message h.
To solve the game it is useful to introduce the following denition.
Denition 2 A mechanism induces signicant learning when UH;1 (pH;2(l))  UH;1 (pH;2(h)) 6= 0.
Suppose that there is no di¤erence between buyers continuation values when he lies and when
he tells the truth. From (6), sellers posteriors for both messages are either above L=H or either
below it. Therefore, no matter the message sent by the buyer in the rst period, in the former case
the seller is proposing at r = 1 a price posting equal to H and in the latter case, a price posting
equal to L. Note that sellers expected continuation value is linear on pH and equal to V1 (pH).13
Suppose on the other hand, that there is di¤erence between buyers continuation values when he
lies and when he tells the truth. From (6) and since qH  qL, it must be that the sellers posterior
when she observes a message h is higher or equal to L=H and when she observes a messages l is
lower than it. Hence, the di¤erence between buyers continuation values is equal to . Therefore,
the seller is proposing at r = 1 a di¤erent price posting depending on the message observed in the
rst period: H in case of observing message h and L in case of l.
The interpretation indicates that learning becomes relevant when it induces the seller to o¤er a
di¤erent mechanism in the next period.
The problem is splitted into two subproblems to solve it. First, taking q2 as given, it is solved
with respect to x2. Second, it is solved with respect to q2 using the allocations obtained in the rst
step.14
Consider the rst subproblem. Note that because the sellers payo¤s are increasing in x2(h) and
that an increment of x2(h) relaxes the SMC2, then the optimal x2(h) is 1. Two di¤erent situations
arise to obtain the allocation for message l: when low-type buyer reports his type with probability
one (i.e., qL = 0) and when he lies with positive probability (i.e., qL 6= 0).
In the rst case, the allocation when a message l is sent depends on the value of H;3 and is given
by
x2(l) =
8><>:
0 if H;3 >
L
H
;
2 if H;3 =
L
H
;
 if H;3 <
L
H
;
; (9)
with 2 2 [0; ] and  = min

1; 1  UH;1(pH;2(l)) + 
UH;1(pH;2(h))


. When H;3 = L=H , the
sellers payo¤s are constant for any x2(l) 2 [0; ]. Then, to simplify the analysis assume x2(l) = 0
13 In other words, the convex combination of sellers continuation values, H;3V1(pH;2 (h)) +
 
1  H;3

V1(pH;2 (l)) is
equal to V1(pH). There are two possible situations when there is no signicant learning: when pH <
L
H
and sellers
continuation values are V1(pH;2(h)) = V1(pH;2(l)) = L (i.e., V1(pH) = L); when pH  LH and sellers continuation
values are V1(pH;2(h)) = pH;2(h)H and V1(pH;2(l)) = pH;2(l)H (i.e., V1(pH) = pHH).
14 It is used the general property Max
fx;yg
f(x; y) =Max
fxg

Max
fyg
f(x; y)

.
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at H;3 = L=H .
When qL 6= 0, the low-type is indi¤erent to both messages and the SMC2 holds with equality,
restricting the value of x2(l), which is now given by
x2(l) = 1  
UH;1 (pH;2(l))

+ 
UH;1 (pH;2(h))

: (10)
To solve the second subproblem, di¤erentiate those cases where the good is allocated with zero
probability in case of message l (x2(l) = 0) and with positive probability (x2(l) 6= 0).
Denition 3 A mechanism has SMC non-binding if x2(l) = 0 and SMC binding if x2(l) 6= 0.
In both cases, there exist incentive feasible mechanisms that induces signicant learning and
with no-learning (i.e., when learning is not relevant). Notice that allocation x2(l) = 0 occurs only
when low-type buyer reports his type with probability one and, from (9), when H;3  L=H . On
the other hand, x2(l) 6= 0 occurs either when qL = 0 and H;3 < L=H , or when qL 6= 0. In both
cases, by (9) or (10), respectively, x2(l) = 1    when there is learning and x2(l) = 1 when there is
no-learning.
Hence there are four candidates to be the optimal mechanisms depending on the prior (detailed
discussion is relegated to the Appendix). These four candidates are enumerated next, including the
maximum payo¤ that the seller makes in each case.
1. SMC binding with no-learning (SMC*+NL): with x2(h) = 1, x2(l) = 1, and qH = qL 6= 0;
L + max fpHH ; Lg :
2. SMC binding with learning (SMC*+L): with x2(h) = 1, x2(l) = 1  , and qH = 1; for any qL;
L + pHH :
3. SMC non-binding with learning (SMC+L): (dened for pH  LH ) with x2(h) = 1, x2(l) = 0,
and qH = 1; qL = 0;
pHH + L:
4. SMC non-binding with no-learning (SMC+NL): (dened for pH  p, where p = L2H+
L
H
)
with x2(h) = 1, x2(l) = 0, and qH =
pHH L
pH
; qL = 0;
pHH   L

H + pHH :
Hence, the rst candidate is a pooling mechanism in which both types randomizes between
messages. The second one is a semi-separation mechanism under which the high-type reports his
type with certainty while the low-type randomizes. The third candidate is a separation mechanism
under which both types reports the truth with probability one. Finally, SMC+NL is another semi-
separation mechanism but at di¤erent terms than previous one in which the high-type is randomizing
between messages and the low-type reports his type with probability one. It is proved later that
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SMC*+L is not payo¤ equivalent to a price posting (in Proposition 2), while the remaining three
mechanisms are (in Corollary 1).15 For the moment, assume this is true.
Notice that at a prior pH =
L
H

H+
L+

, the seller is indi¤erent between a separation price
posting (SMC+L) and a semi-separation one (SMC+NL). Denote this prior as 2 and assume,
without a loss of generality, that when pH = 2 the seller proposes the semi-separation price posting.
At a prior equal L=H , pooling, non-price posting and separation price posting give the same payo¤
to the seller. Denote it with 2 and, again without a loss of generality, assume that the seller proposes
a separation price posting at that prior.
It is straightforward to check under which prior the seller nds optimal to choose each mechanism.
This is stated in next proposition.
Proposition 1 The optimal selling mechanism veries that:
- if pH < 2, (SMC binding with no-learning) with x2 (h) = 1, x2 (l) = 1, w2 (h) = L, w2 (l) = L,
and qH = qL 6= 0.
- if pH 2 [2; 2), (SMC non-binding with learning) with x2 (h) = 1, x2 (l) = 0, w2 (h) = H   ,
w2 (l) = 0, qH = 1 and qL = 0:
- if pH  2, (SMC non-binding with no-learning) with x2 (h) = 1, x2 (l) = 0, w2 (h) = H ,
w2 (l) = 0, qH =
pHH L
pH
and qL = 0:
Proof. Directly from previous cases. It only remains to get w2 (h) and w2 (l). These variables
are just mechanic substitutions in ICH;2 and IR

L;2.
The thought behind the results of the proposition are the following. The rst case corresponds
with the seller being pessimistic (pH < 2). In this case she proposes pooling, i.e., she sells at a
price equal to the low-type value while resigns from learning. The seller has only one alternative: to
propose the non-price posting SMC*+L in which she sells to both types at di¤erent terms and learns
after a message h. In this alternative, she would like that payments for each message were di¤erent
but close to each other. However, the SMC2 restricts sellers capability of doing that, making this
mechanism dominated by pooling.
When the seller is optimistic (pH  2), a mechanism SMC+L or a SMC+NL is the optimal one.
In both cases, when observing a message h, the optimal mechanism in next period is to sell only
to a high-type buyer at a price equal to his value. In particular, if pH  2 (the seller is extremely
optimistic), she prefers a semi-separation price posting. In such a case, there is no-learning and the
optimal mechanism is such that she sells only to the high-type buyer in the second period no matter
the message observed in the rst period.16 Therefore, in the second period, the buyer always makes
zero surplus. On the other hand, when the seller is moderately optimistic, i.e., pH 2
h
L
H
; 2

, the
optimal mechanism induces learning. In next period, she sells to a high-type buyer at a price equal
to his value only in the case of observing h in the rst period. Otherwise, she sells to both types
at a low-type value price. In this mechanism, the seller is paying a bribe to incentive the high-type
buyer to reveal his type. This bribe is equal to his discounted future losses by being discriminated
15Although it could be thought that it is enough to check whether allocations in these direct mechanisms are 1 or
0 (as in Denition 1), it is also necessary to take into account continuation values. The reason is that it is possible
that a direct mechanism with allocations di¤erent to 1 and 0; and with some particular continuation values, is payo¤
equivalent to a price posting with di¤erent continuation values.
16The seller picks a qH that "commits" her to sell in the second period to the high-type buyer at a price equal to his
valuation while also asking a high payment in the rst period. This qH is lower than one (assigning positive probability
of lying to a high-type), keeping her optimistic enough in the case of observing a message l.
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in the second period. Therefore, the buyer makes zero surplus in the second period in case the of
reporting h or positive surplus in case of reporting l.17 Alternatively, using a non-price posting, the
seller could obtain the same posteriors (and as consequence the same continuation values) but, since
she has to keep both types indi¤erent between messages, she has to ask for a lower payment in the
rst period.
Next gure summarizes optimal belief dynamic for each prior.
Figure 1: Optimal belief dynamic under di¤erent pri-
ors. Vertical line at the left represents the prior at
r=2. Vertical line at the right represents the posteriors.
Full-line arrow is the belief dynamic under a message h.
Dot-line arrow is the belief dynamic under a message l.
Proposition 1 gives a characterization of the optimal selling mechanisms for any prior. It was
assumed above that they were payo¤ equivalent to price posting. The following corollary states that
this assumption was right. The proof proposes an alternative outcome (q̂2; p̂2;  ̂2) where  ̂2 is a price
posting mechanism (i.e., an indirect mechanism). Next, its check (for any prior) whether this outcome
is payo¤ equivalent to the incentive e¢ cient outcome (q2; p2; 2) that solves (7) and which contains
the optimal selling mechanism characterized in previous propositions (which are direct mechanisms).
Corollary 1 The optimal selling mechanism at r = 2 can be implemented by a price posting. In
particular:
1) when pH <
L
H
, the price is L, both types always buy,
2) when pH 2
h
L
H
; 2

, the price is H   , the high-type buyer always buys and low-type buyer
never buys, and
3) when pH  2, the price is H , the high-type buyer randomizes with probability pHH LpH and
low-type buyer never buys.
Proof. See the Appendix
These results reassert that the price posting mechanisms are the optimal mechanisms when the
seller is not restricted to take-it-or-leave-it o¤ers.
4 Di¤erence in patience
This section shows that when buyer and seller di¤er in their patience price posting is no longer
optimal.
17To o¤er this bribe, the seller considers that the high-type is going to report the truth with probability one, i.e.,
she picks qH = 1.
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Suppose that both players have di¤erent discount factors:  for the seller,  for the buyer.
Previous section analyzed  = , showing that price posting was optimal. When  6= , sellers
problem is similar to (8) changing only the discount factor that a¤ects sellers continuation values
(i.e.,  is replaced by ).
Using the same procedure than in Section 3, the seller gets the following maximum payo¤s in
each case:
1. SMC*+NL: with x2 (h) = 1, x2 (l) = 1, w2 (h) = L, w2 (l) = L, and qH = qL 6= 0.
L + max fpHH ; Lg :
2. SMC*+L: with x2 (h) = 1, x2 (l) = 1  , w2 (h) = L, w2 (l) = (1  )L, and qH = 1 (for any
 6= ); qL = 0 (if  > ), qL ! 1 (if  < ),
L + (   ) (1  pH) L + pHH ; if  > ;
! L + pHH ; if  < :
3. SMC+L: (dened for pH  LH ) with x2 (h) = 1, x2 (l) = 0, w2 (h) = H   , w2 (l) = 0, and
qH = 1, qL = 0,
pHH + (   ) pH + L:
4. SMC+NL: (dened for pH  p) with x2 (h) = 1, x2 (l) = 0, w2 (h) = H , w2 (l) = 0, and
qH =
pHH L
pH
; qL = 0,
pHH   L

H + pHH :
Suppose the seller is more patient than the buyer ( > ). Now, in the SMC*+L mechanism,
she nds optimal to consider that both types are reporting their types with certainty. Therefore,
this mechanism is working as a separation mechanism. It turns out that when the seller is more
patient and when she is pessimistic, SMC*+L may give larger payo¤ to the seller than pooling. Next
proposition states this result. It additionally proves that SMC*+L cannot be implemented by a price
posting.
Proposition 2 For any  > , there exists a prior pH < LH such that price posting is not optimal.
Proof. See the Appendix.
The intuition behind the preposition can be understood with the following trick. Suppose a seller
who is very patient faces a buyer who is not (with  ! 0). Suppose also that the seller is pessimistic
about facing a high-type buyer. From previous analysis, the seller can propose either pooling or a
non-price posting mechanism. In the former case, she resigns to learning by selling in both periods
with probability one. Under the latter, she sells to both types at di¤erent terms, learning when she
observes a message h. Since the buyer does not value the future, he behaves as he was in the one
period game, reporting the truth with certainty. Additionally, the sellers cost of inducing separation
with this mechanism is proportional to . Hence, the non-price posting improves her payo¤ with
respect to pooling. In case that the seller is optimistic, again with a separation or semi-separation
price posting, she can learn as much as under the non-price posting mechanism while getting larger
instant expected payo¤.
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Figure 2: Sellers payo¤s under di¤erent mechanisms when  =  (at the left) and whne  <  (at
the right). In Dot-line case SMC*+NL; in Small-dash-line case SMC*+L (coincident with case
SMC*+NL when pH;3  2 in the graph at the left); in Dash-line case SMC+L; in Solid-line
case SMC+NL.
The following example illustrates, for a particular prior, how large has to be the di¤erence between
discount factors to have that price posting is not optimal.
Example 1 Di¤erent Discount Factors:
Let consider L = 1, H = 2; a prior pH = 13 and  = 1. Case SMC+L and SMC+NL are not
dened for pH <
L
H
.
Sellers payo¤s using a mechanism from case SMC*+NL are equal to L + L, i.e. V2 = 2:0.
Sellers payo¤s using a mechanism from case SMC*+L are equal to L+(   ) (1  pH) L+pHH ,
i.e. V2 = 1 + (1   )23 +
2
3 . Choosing the appropriate value for , previous sellers payo¤s can be
larger than L + L.
The next chart shows how sellers payo¤s change with :
When  = 0:25, a mechanism with SMC*+L (case 2) maximizes sellers payo¤s making V2 = 2:17.
Buyers payo¤s are equal to 1 for the high-type buyer and 0 for the low-type buyer. This mechanism
cannot be implemented by a price posting as was proved in Proposition 2.
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In the example the seller is moderately pessimistic about facing a high-type buyer. This is, she
believes that the probably of facing a high-type buyer is small, but it is still large enough to leave
room for nding optimal to learn when, at the same time, she is relatively more patient than the
buyer. Notice that sellers payo¤ under the non-price posting is larger than under pooling when
pH
L(1 pH) > . In the example, it occurs when 0:5 > .
4.1 Implications
Hart and Tirole (1988) proved that, in a two period setting, the seller makes the same payo¤ when
selling a durable good than when renting it. This result relies on the fact that they used price posting
as the selling mechanism in both cases (i.e., a selling price and a rental price respectively) and buyers
are non-anonymous (the seller can track their behavior as in the current model).
The model proposed in the current paper can be interpreted as a renting model of a durable good
in which the seller does not restrict herself to use price posting. Hence, Proposition 2 implies that,
when the seller is slightly more patient than the buyer, she prefers renting with a non-price posting
than renting or selling with a price posting when she is pessimistic and the opposite when she is
optimistic. Hence, the selling and the rental model of a durable good are not equivalent anymore.
Additionally, in Hart and Tirole (1988) model, sellers payo¤ with commitment are larger or
equal than sellers payo¤with imperfect commitment.18 The optimal SMC*+L mechanism proposed
in this section can also be implemented under commitment. Hence, price posting may not be the
optimal mechanism under commitment neither.
This implications are summarized in next chart where: V 1 and V 2 denote sellers payo¤s with
imperfect commitment and with commitment respectively when she restricts herself to use a price
posting and; V 3 denotes sellers payo¤ when she exclusively uses a non-price posting mechanism.
when seller is optimistic;> V> V > V = V when she is pessimistic
Sale V2 V1
Rental V2 V1
V3 V3
Seller's profits in two-period setting
Commitment Imperfect-commitment
V2 1 3 3 2 1
Price
Posting
Non-price posting
V
4.2 Goethes Mechanism
This subsection shows that the model explains why the mechanism proposed by Goethe (see the
Introduction) may be optimal when price posting is not.
To prove so, using previous example, it is constructed a variation of the mechanism à la Goethe
and its equilibrium. Next, it is shown that payo¤s of this mechanism are arbitrarily close to payo¤s
of the optimal mechanism in the example.
Example 2 Goethes Mechanism:
Publisher valuations are L = 1 or H = 2. Goethe has a prior pH = 13 . Discount factors are
 = 1 for Goethe and  = 0:25 for the publisher.
At last period r = 1, Goethe uses the optimal price posting mechanism described at the beginning
of Section 3.
At r = 2, Goethe proposes to the publisher the following mechanism:
18 In their paper, they use non-commitment to indicate what in this paper was called imperfect commitment.
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 Goethe sends to a lawyer a sealed envelope with his reservation price R 2 <+. Previously,
Goethe commits with the publisher to the probability with which he will send each possible
value of R.19
 At the same time, the publisher sends to the lawyer a sealed envelope with his o¤er m 2 <+.
 If m  R, sale takes place at price R (i.e. x(m) = 1; w(m) = R). If m < R, the good is not
sold (i.e. x(m) = 0; w(m) = 0).
An equilibrium for this mechanism is:
 Goethe commits to send a reservation price R1 = L + " with probability p, and R2 = L with
probability (1  p), where p =  " .
 High-type reports m1 = L + " and low-type reports m2 = L.
Publishers payo¤s for messagem1 andm2 (Ui;2(m1) and Ui;2(m2) respectively, where i 2 fL;Hg)
are:
UH;2(m1) = p ( + ") + (1  p);
UH;2(m2) = p + (1  p) ( + ) ;
UL;2(m1) =  p";
UL;2(m2) = 0:
Notice that UH;2(m1) > UH;2(m2) and UL;2(m2) > UL;2(m1) when " > 0. It follows that each type
reports his respective message with probability one, revealing their types. High-type buyer gets the
poem no matter the reservation price sent by Goethe and low-type buyer gets it only in case of R2.
Hence, Goethes payo¤ is
V2 = pH [pR1 + (1  p)R2 + H ] + (1  pH) [(1  p)R2 + L] :
When "! 0, types are almost indi¤erent between messages with UH;2()!  and UL;2()! 0.
Goethe makes V2 ! 2:17, almost as the optimal mechanism at Example 1. Therefore, Goethes
Mechanism is optimal in the limit.
5 Concluding Remarks
This paper establishes that the optimal selling mechanism when an uniformed seller with imperfect
commitment faces the same consumer in a two periods game is to post a price in each one. This result
holds whenever there is no di¤erence in discount factors. Otherwise price posting is not optimal and
the Goethes Mechanism can be rationalized. The method used to solve this problem relies on the
procedure proposed by Bester and Strausz (2001).
This paper can be extended in many directions. The more natural extension is to generalize the
model for more periods.20 Allowing more than two periods provides a richer environment in which
the seller can engage in a strategy of gradual learning. On the other hand, learning is restricted by
19Notice that this is a variation of the mechanism proposed by Goethe described at the Introduction, where he does
not commit to the probability with which he will send each reservation price. It is assumed this commitment of Goethe
to construct the equilibrium below.
20Beccuti (2014), which can be downloaded from the web, studies the multi-period setting for an equal level of
patience.
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the sequential monotonicity constraint. Large discount factors not only implies that separation and
some semi-separation price posting are not feasible but also that the seller cannot take advantage
from learning with a non-price posting mechanism.
It can be also analyzed the case with many buyers. Bester and Strausz (2000) shows that a direct
mechanism with truthful reporting is not possible in a multi-buyer case. In the same direction, Evans
and Reiche (2008) proves that the revelation principle fails in the multi-buyer setting but only if at
least two buyers have private information. To study an environment with more than one privately
informed buyer it is necessary to consider another approach.
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6 Appendix
6.1 Dening a new mechanism that changes role of messages.
Lemma: An incentive feasible outcome (qr; pr; r), where  r is a direct mechanism, such that qL > qH is
payo¤ equivalent to an incentive feasible outcome (q̂r; p̂r; r), with the same direct mechanism  r, such that
q̂H > q̂L.
Proof. Suppose an incentive feasible outcome (qr; pr; r), where  r is a direct mechanism, and with
qL> qH . Since qH> 0 and qL< 1 by the Revelation Principle, all IC constraints hold with equality, i.e.
ICH;r: uH;r(h) + UH;r 1(pr(h)) = uH;r(l) + UH;r 1(pr(l));
ICL;r: uL;r(l) + UL;r 1(pr(l)) = uL;r(h) + UL;r 1(pr(h)):
By incentive feasibility IR and BR are satised,
IRH;r: uH;r(h) + UH;r 1(pr(h))  0;
IRL;r: uL;r(l) + UL;r 1(pr(l))  0;
BRr: pH;r (mr)
X
j2
pj;r+1qj (mr)= pH;r+1qH (mr) with mr= l; h:
The new outcome (q̂r; p̂r; r) is created by renaming types such that now, q̂H= qL and q̂L= qH . Hence
q̂H> q̂L. It is straightforward to check that new constraints are all satised, with ICH;r= IĈL;r, ICL;r= IĈH;r,
IRH;r= IR̂L;r, IRL;r= IR̂H;r and pH;r (mr)= p̂L;r (mr).
Also, the seller remains indi¤erent, i.e.X
i2
X
mr2fl;hg
pi;r+1qi (mr)

vr(mr) + V r 1(pr(mr))

=
X
i2
X
mr2fl;hg
p̂i;r+1q̂i (mr)

vr(mr) + V r 1(p̂r(mr))

:
6.2 Proof of Remark 1
Proof. Consider a static framework, a message set M1 = f"take  it"; "leave  it"g ; and the following
allocation rule
x1(m1) =

1 if m1= take  it;
0 if m1= leave  it;
; m12M1:
Dene the probabilities of observing each message with
q̂i(take  it)  qix1(h) + (1  qi)x1(l);
q̂i(leave  it)  1  q̂i(take  it);
Hence, by the Revelation Principle qH= 1 and qL= 0 then q̂H(take  it) = 1, q̂L(take  it) = x1(l).
When pH;2< L=H the optimal direct selling mechanism has allocations x1(l) = 1, then q̂L(take  it) = 1.
Using a price ŵ1(take  it) = L, instant payo¤s under both mechanisms are equal for every player.
When pH L=H , x1(l) = 0 and q̂L(take  it) = 0. The optimal direct selling mechanism has payments
w1(h) = H and w1(l) = 0. Using ŵ1(take  it) = w1(h), instant payo¤s under both mechanisms are equal for
every player. Therefore, both mechanisms are payo¤ equivalent.
6.3 Proof of Lemma 2
Proof. This proof follows a similar procedure than in the static case. So, it has three steps:
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Step 1: ICH;2 + IRL;2 =) IRH;2,
First, notice that uH;2(m2) + UH;1(p2(m2))  uL;2(m2) + UL;1(p2(m2)) 8m2 by x2(m2)H   w2(m2) 
x2(m2)L   w2(m2), UL;1 (p2) = 0 8p2 and UH;1 (p2)  0 8p2.
Therefore, uH;2(l)+ UH;1(p2(l))  uL;2(l)+ UL;1(p2(l)) and, by IRL;2 and ICH;2, it must be that uH;2(h)+
UH;1(p2(h))  0, i.e. IRH;2 holds.
Step 2: Optimality =) IRL;2 + ICH;2,
Optimality means that the seller proposes an outcome (q2; p2; 2) that maximize her prots.
Recall that, since p2(h)  p2(l), UH;1(p2(h))  UH;1(p2(l)):
Let rs prove that optimality implies IRL;2.
From step 1, uH;2(h) + UH;1(p2(h))  uL;2(l) + UL;1(p2(l)), with UL;1(p2(l)) = 0:
Now assume that both types start with the same payment ŵ2, then
x2(h)H   ŵ2 + UH;1(p2(h))  x2(l)L   ŵ2 > 0:
In order to improve her payo¤s, the seller increases the payment ŵ2 asked to both types by some amount w.
She continues doing that up to x2(l)L  ŵ2 w = 0, i.e. IRL;2 is binding and w2(l) = ŵ2+w. Note that
ICH;2 and ICL;2 both hold while changing ŵ2. A larger increment in w violates IRL;2.
To prove that optimality implies ICH;2, notice rst that continuation values are completely determined by qH
and qL and suppose some xed continuation values for the high-type buyer. Once the seller xes w2(l), she
continues increasing the payment for message h by w0 up to
x2(h)H   (w2(l) + w0) + UH;1(p2(h)) = x2(l)H   w2(l) + UH;1(p2(l)):
During the process, she could be inducing di¤erent qH and qL but in such a way that continuation values do
not change. At this point, the seller does not increase the payment anymore. If it were the case, the high-type
buyer will send a low-type message, violating ICH;2. As consequence, ICH;2 is binding for those particular
continuation values. For another pair of continuation values, the seller follows the same procedure, getting
again ICH;2 binding for the new continuation values. Hence, when maximizing her prots, the seller chooses
some outcome (q2; p2; 2) such that ICH;2 is binding.
Note that ICL;2 continues holding while the seller increases the payment w0.
Step 3: IRL;2 + IC

H;2 + SMC2 , IRL;2 + ICH;2 + ICL;2
(: Operating with ICH;2:
w2(h)  w2(l) = x2(h)H   x2(l)H +  [UH;1 (p2(h))  UH;1 (p2(l))] :
Plugging it into ICL;2 and operating again:
x2(h) + 
UH;1 (p2(h))

 x2(l) + 
UH;1 (p2(l))

with equality if qL > 0;
the Sequential Monotonicity Constraint (SMC2)
): Starting from the SMC2, multiplying it by  and using ICH;2 and IRL;2 it is recovered ICL;2:
6.4 Feasibility of candidates
Lemma: A mechanism with SMC non-binding with no-learning is o¤ered only when pH  L2H +
L
H
and
one with SMC non-binding with learning only when pH  L=H . Mechanisms with SMC binding have no
restrictions on the prior.
Proof. A mechanism with SMC non-binding with no-learning requires qL = 0, H;3  L=H and
pH;2(l)  L=H . Since qL = 0, H;3  L=H i¤ qH  LHpH and pH;2(l)  L=H i¤ qH  1  
(1 pH)
pH
L
 .
Both conditions are satised when pH  L2H +
L
H
.
A mechanism with SMC non-binding with learning requires qL = 0, H;3  L=H and pH;2(h)  L=H >
pH;2(l). Now, again since qL = 0, qH  LHpH and, qH > 1  
(1 pH)
pH
L
 . From qH 2 [0; 1] ; rst condition is
19
satised only when pH  L=H , and the second one for any pH < 1.
Finally, a mechanism with SMC binding requires qL 6= 0 or qL = 0 and H;3 < L=H . In case of learning,
it also requires pH;2(h)  L=H (when pH < L=H) or pH;2(l) < L=H (when pH  L=H). In case
of no-learning, pH;2(h) < L=H when pH < L=H or pH;2(l)  L=H when pH  L=H . There is no
restriction on the prior for both cases of SMC binding.
6.5 Candidates to be optimal mechanisms when seller and buyer are equally patient.
1. SMC binding with no-learning (SMC*+NL)
By no-learning, UH;1 (pH;2(l)) UH;1 (pH;2(h)) = 0. Then, the expected continuation value for the seller
is equal to V1 (pH) (see discussion following Denition 2). By SMC binding, x2(l) 6= 0. From (10) and
no-learning it must be that x2(l) = 1. Substituting continuation values and allocations at (??) and after
some simplications results in the sellers maximum payo¤s equal to
L + max fpHH ; Lg :
The seller is indi¤erent among any pair (qL; qH) such that there is SMC binding with no-learning. Hence,
assume qL = qH 6= 0 (i.e. pH;2(h) = pH;2(l) = pH) without a loss of generality.
2. SMC binding with learning (SMC*+L)
Now UH;1 (pH;2(l)) UH;1 (pH;2(h)) 6= 0 by learning. Because pH;2(h)  L=H > pH;2(l), UH;1 (pH;2(l)) 
UH;1 (pH;2(h)) =  by (6) and, V1(pH;2 (h)) = pH;2 (h) H and V1(pH;2 (l)) = L by (??). By SMC
binding x2(l) 6= 0; and jointly with learning, x2(l) = 1   . Substituting allocations and continuation
values at (??) and after some simplications, the seller chooses (qL; qH) to maximize
L + H;3pH;2 (h) H :
According to Bayesrule H;3pH;2 (h) = pHqH . Because qH  1, a mechanism with SMC binding with
learning is weakly dominated by a mechanism under case 1 for any prior.
3. SMC non-binding with learning (SMC+L)
Now UH;1 (pH;2(l)) UH;1 (pH;2(h)) =  by learning and x2(l) = 0 by SMC non-binding. The allocation
x2(l) = 0 implies that qL = 0 and H;3  L=H , i.e. qH  LHpH . This last requirement jointly with
pH;2(h)  L=H > pH;2(l) (by learning) implies pH  L=H (see Lemma 4 in the Appendix). From
(??), V1(pH;2 (h)) = pH;2 (h) H and V1(pH;2 (l)) = L. Therefore, the seller chooses qH to maximize
H;3H + L;
subject to qL = 0; H;3  L=H , pH;2(l) < L=H ;
getting
pHH + L:
when qH = 1.
4. SMC non-binding with no-learning (SMC+NL)
no-learning means UH;1 (pH;2(l))   UH;1 (pH;2(h)) = 0 with expected continuation value for the seller
equals to V1 (pH) (see above). SMC non-binding means x2(l) = 0. The necessary conditions for the
optimum of the rst problem implies that qL = 0 and H;3  L=H , i.e. qH  LHpH . Additionally, by
no-learning, it must be that pH;2(l)  L=H .21 To satisfy previous requirements it is necessary that
pH  p (where p = L2H +
L
H
, see Lemma 4 in the Appendix). After substitutions at (??) and
21qL = 0 gives pH;2(h) = 1 by BR2. Then, by non-learning, it must be that pH;2(h)  pH;2(l)  LH .
20
simplications, the seller chooses qH to maximize
H;3H + pHH ;
subject to qL = 0; H;3  L=H , pH;2(l)  L=H ;
getting
pHH   L

H + pHH ;
with qH =
pHH L
pH
:
6.6 Proof of Corollary 1
Proof. Consider for period r = 2 a message setM2 = f"take  it"; "leave  it"g ; and the following allocation
rule
x2(m2) =

1 if m2 = take  it;
0 if m2 = leave  it;
; m2 2M2:
Dene the probabilities of observing each message with
q̂i(take  it)  qix2(h) + (1  qi)x2(l);
q̂i(leave  it)  1  q̂i(take  it):
Posteriors p̂i;2(take  it) and p̂i;2(leave  it) are given by Bayes rule.
When pH < L=H the optimal direct selling mechanism has allocations x2(h) = x2(l) = 1, hence
q̂H(take   it) = 1, q̂L(take   it) = 1 and p̂H;2(take   it) = pH . It follows that continuation values with
the price posting are equal than under the direct mechanisms, i.e., Ui;1(p̂2(take   it)) = Ui;1(pH;2(h)) for
both types and V1(p̂2(take  it)) = V1(pH;2(h)). Using a price ŵ2(take  it) = L, instant payo¤s under both
mechanisms are also equal for every player.
When pH  L=H the optimal direct selling mechanism has payments w2(h) = H and w2(l) = 0, or
w2(h) = H  and w2(l) = 0; with allocations x2(h) = 1 and x2(l) = 0. It follows that: q̂H(take it) = qH ,
q̂L(take   it) = qL; p̂H;2(take   it) = pH;2(h) and p̂H;2(leave   it) = pH;2(l). Again, continuation values
are equal for both mechanisms, i.e., Ui;1(p̂2(take   it)) = Ui;1(p2(h)), Ui;1(p̂2(leave   it)) = Ui;1(p2(l)),
V1(p̂2(take  it)) = V1(p2(h)) and V1(p̂2(leave  it)) = V1(p2(l)). Using ŵ2(take  it) = w2(h), instant payo¤s
under both mechanisms are also equal for every player.
Then, for every prior, it is possible to implement an outcome (q̂2; p̂2;  ̂2); where  ̂2 is a price posting
mechanism, which is payo¤ equivalent to the incentive e¢ cient outcome (q2; p2; 2) that solves (7)
6.7 Proof of Proposition 2
Proof. Since sellers payo¤s under the non-price posting mechanism are bounded above by pooling (SMC*+NL)
for any prior when  < , the following proof focus on  > .
The structure of the proof is the following: First, it proves that a price posting mechanism is always
optimal when pH  L=H . Next, it proves that SMC*+L is the optimal mechanism for certain priors when
pH < L=H . Finally, it proves that, in this last case, there is not a price posting mechanism payo¤ equivalent
to SMC*+L.
Consider pH  L=H . Sellers payo¤s under SMC+NL are larger than those under SMC+L when pH 
L(H+)
[LH+(H+( )L)] and the opposite otherwise (provided that both are dened for the prior). On the
other hand, SMC+L gives larger sellers payo¤s than any of the mechanisms with SMC*. Hence, price posting
is optimal with such a prior.
Consider now pH < L=H . For these priors SMC+NL and SMC+L are not dened. On the other hand,
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SMC*+L gives larger payo¤s to the seller than SMC*+NL when
pH + pHL > L:
Suppose  =  + ". After operating, previous inequality holds if
pH >
L
H + "
:
Since H + " > H for all " > 0, then there exist pH 2

L
H+"
; LH

such that payo¤s under SMC*+L
are larger than payo¤s under SMC*+NL.
It remains to show that there is not a price posting mechanism payo¤ equivalent to the SMC*+L when the
seller nds optimal to implement it. Notice that SMC*+L implies qH = 1; qL = 0. Following denitions in the
proof of Corollary 1, if SMC*+L can be implemented by a price posting, it must be that q̂H(take  it) = x2(h)
(i.e., q̂H(take  it) = 1) and q̂L(take  it) = x2(l) (i.e., q̂L(take  it) = 1  ).
The seller can o¤er a price posting mechanisms with a price lower than L, equal to L or larger than L.
Suppose a mechanism with a price lower to L and payo¤ equivalent to SMC*+L. No matter whether the
seller learns or not with this price posting, low-type buyer makes zero payo¤ in the last period while he gets
positive payo¤ in the rst period sending "take  it" and zero with "leave  it". This is implies that low-type
strictly prefers a message "take  it" than "leave  it", i.e., q̂L(take  it) = 1 which is a contradiction for any
 6= 0.
Suppose now a mechanism with a price larger than L and payo¤ equivalent to SMC*+L. Now, no matter
posteriors, low-type buyer strictly prefers sending "leave   it", otherwise he makes negative prots. This is,
q̂L(take  it) = 0, contradiction ( cannot be 1 when  < ).
Finally, consider the case of a price posting mechanism with a price larger equal to L and payo¤ equivalent
to SMC*+L. If the seller does not learn, she asks for a price equal to the low-type buyers valuation in the
second period (recall pH < L=H), making L + L which is payo¤ equivalent to SMC*+L only when
pH =
L
H+"
. If she learns, in the second period she will propose a price H when she observes "take  it",
and L when she observes "leave it". Hence, high-type buyer strictly prefers "take it", i.e., q̂H(take it) = 1
and p̂H;2(leave   it) = 0. On the other hand, low-type buyer is indi¤erent between both messages. Assume
that q̂L(take  it) = 1   (as it is required). In this case, the seller gets
V2 = [pH + (1  pH)(1  )] [ŵ2(take  it) + V1(p̂2(take  it))]
+ [1  pH   (1  pH)(1  )] [V1(p̂2(leave  it))]
= (pH + (1  pH)(1  )) L + pHH + (1  pH)L;
which is lower than sellers payo¤s under SMC*+L. Hence, this price posting is not payo¤s equivalent to
SMC*+L when is optimal to the seller to propose it.
When  < , sellers payo¤s under the non-price posting mechanism are bounded above by pooling
(SMC*+NL).
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